ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

to the defendant's credibility and not to his competency. We
regard the rule thus laid down on that point as the proper construction of the law since defendants have been permitted to testify on
their own behalf in criminal cases, and we still adhere to it. In -a
criminal cause the intent is a fact known to, and peculiarly within
the knowledge of, the defendant, and we see no well-founded reason
why he may not testify concerning it as he might*as to any other
fact of which.he has knowledge. Because the intent is a fact which
cannot in the nature of things be positively known to others, and is
hence a matter about which other witnesses cannot directly testify,
does not, in our opinion, affect the rule above laid down as to the
competency of the defendant in that respect.
We are clearly of the opinion, therefore, that the court below
erred in excluding the proposed testimony of the appellant as to the
intention existing in his mind when he came into the possession of
the meat which he is charged with having stolen. There are other
errors assigned on the record of this cause, and other causes for a
new trial were assigned in the court below, but the view we have
already taken as to the action of that court in excluding the proposed testimony of the appellant renders it unnecessary for us to
consider any of the other alleged errors at present.
The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for a
new trial.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
COURT OF CHANOERY OF DZLAWAME.
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.3
SUPREME COURT oF WISCONsN.
CONTRACT. See endor
Rescssion-peific Performanc.--Thecomplainant and the defendant, A., entered into a parol contract for an exchange of lands-the complainant agreeing to convey a tract of woodland and pay $300 in cashthe defendant A., agreeing to convey, together with his wife, a tract of
marsh, the title to which was held by the wife. Possession was mutually
delivered. It was agreed that the parties should meet at the house of
1 From Heon. D. M. Bates, Reporter; to appear in 2 Delaware Chan. Reporti.

9 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 45 Maryland Reports.
3 From Heon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter; to appear in 49 Vermont Reports.
4 From HEon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter ; to appear in 42 Wisconsin Reports.
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G. F. to execute conveyances; but such meeting was delayed and never
took place. The defendant, A., cut off the timber from the woodland
delivered into his possession under the contract. Afterward the defendant, A., without any tender of performance on his part, or demand upon
the complainant for the execution of the contract, sold and conveyed the
marsh to the defendant, I. On bill filed by the complainant for a specific
performance, held, that the defendant, A., was not entitled to abandon
the contract and to re-sell the marsh, without first tendering to the complainant a deed for the marsh and demanding performance on his part;
that, under the circumstances, the complainant was not in laches: Burton v. Adkins, 2 Del. Ch.
Heldfurther, that the defendant, A., was not entitled to abandon the
contract, after having cut the timber off the woodland and thereby substantially destroyed its value, so that the complainant could not be placed
in stata quo: Id.
See Waters and Watercourse.
DAMAGES.
Sale- Warranty.-In case for fraudulent warranty of a yoke of oxen,
the declaration alleged that defendant falsely and fraudulently warranted
the oxen well broken, orderly, peaceable, and suited for a special purpose
known to defendant, for which plaintiff wanted them, whereas they were
unbroken, disorderly, wild, and unsuited for soid purpose, as defendant
well knew. Defendant was allowed, against plaintiff's objection, to show
their market value at the time of sale; but the court charged that the difference between the value of the oxen as they actually were, and their
value as it would have been if they had been as warranted, was the
measure of damages. Held., that the dvidence was inadmissible, and that
the error of its admission was not cured by the charge: Wing v. Chapman, 49 Verm.
DEETOR AND CREDITOR.

Composition with Creditors.-In assumpsit for money paid, &c., defendants, who were insolvent, and who had been trying to compound
with their creditors, and whose property had been under attachment at
the suit of B., introduced in eyidence in bar of plaintiff's claim, a written instrument signed by plaintiff, and other but not all of defendants'
creditors, by B., and by defendants themselves, whereby it was agreed
that "the creditors of" the defendants should "accept their Pro rata
parts of the sum of $1200 in full satisfaction of their respective claims,"
that their several dividends should be ascertained by ascertaining defendants' entire unsecured indebtedness, and dividing said sum pro rata
upon such indebtedness-paying to each creditor such a part of such
sum as his debt'was of such entire indebtedness, and that defendants
and B. should pay to each creditor his part of said sum, ulon demand,
after execution of said instrument, and after proof of, or agreement upon,
the sum due.. Held, that as the instrument was not executed by all the
parties thereto, it was not, under its provisions, binding upon the plaintiff: CThase v..Bailey & Co., 49 Verm.
EQUITY.
RelIf for the Loss or Destruction of Bonds and Negotiabe Securiti .- Where the loss or destruction of bonds and negotiable securities
I VOL. XXV.-95
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has happened without the negligence or fault of the party applying,
equity will grant relief, provided such relief can be given without derogating from any positive agreement., or violating any equal or superior
equity in other parties: Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Blair, 45 Md.
The relief will be granted, however, upon the condition that full and
secure indemnity shall be given the defendant against all risk : Id.
EVIDENCE.

Parol to affect a Written, Instrument.-Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to contradict, add to, or vary a written instrument. Thus, in
ejectment, where plaintiff, in support of his title, introduced in evidence
a deed from R. to Rufus V., and a deed from Russell V. to F., under
whom he claimed, and offered evidence that Rufus V. and Russell V.
were the same person, that the name Russell V. was the true one, and
that the insertion of the name Rufus as that of the grantee in the firstnamed deed, was a clerical error, it was held, that the evidence, the purpose of which was, in legal effect, to reform the deed, was inadmissible:
Ptts v. Brown, 49 Verm.
FENCE. See Railroad.
"HIGHWAY. See Negligence; Town.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Chose in Action.-A married woman is not restricted in the disposition of her choses in action to a joint conveyance with her husband
Trader v. Lowe, 45 Md.
Ante-nuptial Contract-Debtorof Wife has no Interest in.-An antenuptial contract, not recorded, raises no equity, at the suit of a debtor
to the wife dum sola, to restrain the collection of the debt at law by
process in the name of the husband and wife. Such a debtor has no
interest in the contract, entitling him to set it up in equity: Hill v.
Garman and Wife, 2 Del. Ch.
Nor is the debtor at any risk in paying the debt. Such payment
would protect him against any future claim by the trustee under the
contract, who had not interfered to prevent the collection of the debt
by the husband: Id.
INFANT.

Appearance and Defence by .Natural Guardian.-An infant is not
legally capable of appearing and defending, nor of appointing an attorney
to appear and defend for him; but appearance and defence by. his father
and natural guardian are sufficient, and need not appear of record, but
may be shown by parol. Thus, where, in a. suit againsi an infant, his
father became bail, was present during the entire trial, testified on material
points at the suggestion of his son's counsel, assisted in impanelling the
jury, and would have appealed if he had not known of his son's minority,
judgment against the son upon audita querela to set it aside was held
valid and binding: Fuller v. Smith, 49 Verm.
INSURANCE.

Resolution of Insurers subsequent to Policy.-A resolution of the
board of directors, prohibiting certain acts on the part of the insured,
passed subsequent to the issuance of the policy to the plaintiff, not
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communicated to him, and of which he had no notice or knowledge,
his rights under the policy: tartitz v. lutual Fire Ins.
cannot affect
Co , 45 Md.
JUDGM ENT.

Power of Court to revise after the Term.-Judgment for plaintiff by
agreement, and bond filed for its payment. Plaintiff's attorney, by mistake, neglected to make a motion for a certified execution. At a subsequen; term, plaintiff filed a motion to have the case brought forward,
the judgment vacated, and for a certified execution, and the motion was
granted: Held, that the county court had no power to grant the motion : Amazon Ins. Co. v. Partride,49 Verm.
LACHES.

See Vendor.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Construction of Lease-Rig t of Lessor to rent after Eviction.-In'
assumpsit for rent, it appeared that the demised premises were described
in the lease as "the premises on the corner of College street and Centre
street recently occupied by E. Laporte as a French hotel. (The joiners'
shops are not included, but when vacated, Kennedy is to have right to
either or both at same rent they now draw, payable quarterly in advance
$75 and $112 -respectively.") Notice of special matter under the general
issue alleged eviction through plaintiff's neglect properly to drain a cellar under the premises, not included in the lease, whereby the premises
were rendered unfit for occupation. In support of the notice, defendant
sought to show-by parol that the cellar was not occupied by Laporte,
and the evidence so offered was admitted, with evidence in rebuttal tending to show that it was occupied by him. field, that the words,
"recently occupied by E. Laporte as a French hotel," were restrictive
of the grant; that the exception of the joiners' shops did not indicate
an intention to pass all else on that corner owned by plaintiff; that the
evidence was properly admitted; and that the question of whether or
not Laporte occupied the cellar was properly submitted to the jury:
Alger v. Kennedy, 49 Verm.
The lease provided that defendant should put and keep the place in
repair. The court, in charging the jury, after putting several questions
to illustrate the meaning of the phrase, " in repair," said that if the
cellar, was included in the lease, the fault was the defendant's if the
cellar was not taken care of, provided they found that to drain it was a
necessary repair. field, that the question of whether or not the cellar
was in repair was thus submitted to the jury, and that to submit it to
them was erroneous: d..
Any default, as well as any overt act of the lessor, that renders the
tenement dangerous to the life or health of the tenant, may be treated
by the lessee as an eviction. Thus, it was held, that evidence of the
lessor's neglect to drain the cellar was admissible : Id.
If the lessor unlawfully evict the lessee his right to rent thereupon
ceases : Id. MORTGAGE.

Of Chattels--Taking "Possession.-A clause in a chattel mortgage,
providing that if the mortgagee shall at any time deem himself insecure;
he may take possession of and sell the property, vests in him an abso-
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lute discretion ; and his right does not depend upon his having reasonable grotud for deeming himself insecure : lluebner v. Koebke, 42 Wis.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
NEGLIGENCE.

See Areyligence.

See Railroad.

Bodily Injuny-

Defective Highway- Damages.-In
an action
for injuries to plaintiff's person caused by her stepping through a hole
in a sidewalk of the defendant city, where there was evidence that
the walk was on one of the principal thoroughfares of the city, and
that the hole had existed there for several months, this was sufficient to
warrant the jury in finding the city chargeable with notice of the defect:

Hall v. City of Fond du Lac, 42 Wis.
A verdict in plaintiff's favor for $3258 held not excessive in this case,
it appearing satisfactorily that her injury was of a very serious if not of
a permanent character, and would probably render her unable to do any
continuous hard work for years, or perhaps for life Id.
Railroad Companjy-Explosion,of a Loconmtive LEngine-fficiency
of Evidence.-H.. cmployed'as an engineer, on a railroad, was killed by
the explosion of the locomotive engine of which he had charge. An
action was brought against the railroad company for the use of the widow
and minor child of the deceased, to recover damages sust~ained by them
by reason of his death. There was no evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant in the selection of faithful and competent employees.
The ground of the action and the liability of the defendant rested upon
the alleged facts that the engine was unsound and unsafe when it was
purchased and put upon the road, and so continued till the time of the
accident, and that the agent of the defendant, by whom it was purchased,
did not exercise ordinary care in purchasing and procuring a sound and
safe engine. Evidence was offered by the plaintiff as to the purchase of
the engine, the explosion of which caused the death of H. The defendant
proved that the engine wasrepaired about a month before its explosion, and
alleged that there was no evidence of the original and continued unsoundness of the engine and of the alleged negligence of the defendant in
procuring it: Reld, that there was evidence on these questions legally
sufficient to go to the jury, and they were properly submitted to their
decision : Cimberland and Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. The State, 'use

of Hogan, 45 Md.
NEw TRIAL.
Notice to opposite Party.-An application for a new trial is a motion,
which, with the papers on which it is founded, must be served upon
the opposite party, who is also entitled to an opportunity of presenting
affidavits or other evidence against the motion: .Mle Williams v. Bannister, 42 Wis.
A judgment for defendant in a mortgage' foreclosure having been
reversed by this court with direction that if defendant should satisfy
the trial court, by affidavit or other proper proof, that on another trial
she would probably be able to p reduce sufficient additional evidence to
change the result, and plaintiff having taken an order on defendant in
the trial court to show cause why judgment of foreclosure should not
be entered, the court at the hearing of this motion granted a new trial
on plaintiff's application then made, and an affidavit in her behalf then
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read, without any notice of such motion or copy of such affidavit having
been served. Held, error: Id.
A new trial should be granted to defendant only upon reasonable
terms, including payment of costs of the former appeal; and it should
be limited to the question suggested by this court: Id.
NOTICE. See Waters.
Writing-S gnature.-A notice which the statute requires to be in
writing,.is insuffiient where it is not sined by the appellant, nor by
any one for him, and the record fails to show that it was served by him
in person: Eaton v. Atanitowoc County, 42 Wis.
RAILROAD. See Aregligence.
Fence-Negligence.-Whetheror not contributory negligence would
be a defence to an action for an injury arising from the failure of a railroad company'to construct a fence as required by the statute, such negligence may defeat an action for an injury arising from failure of the
company to maintain in repair such a fence, once built: Lawrence v.
A.,
L. S.
Railway Co., 42 Wis.
I Sect.
1, &
ch. V.
268 of 1860, and sect. 30, ch. 119 of 1872, make railroad'companies responsible for, damages occasioned by failure to fence
their tracks, as there required; and, in an action under those statutes,
the injury complained of must be affirmatively shown to have been caused
by the want of a proper railroad fence, the evidence connecting the in.jury with the want of a fence at some point on the road (whether near
to or distant from the plaintiff's premises), and showing that the one
was the consequence of the other: Id.
RErXAsE. See Tort.
SALE.

See Damages.
TAXATION.

Tax Title-UnitedStates Patent:-In ejectment, where plaintiff claims
under a tax deed, -and defendant under a patent from the United States,
and it appears that the tax on which plaintiff's deed was based must have
been levied before the date of the patent, and there is no proof of the
date of entry of the land, it must be presumed that the title to the land
was in the United States when the tax'was levied; and this presumption
rebuts the prima facie evidence of the liability of the land to taxation
furnished by the tai deed: Treat v. Lawrence, 42 Wis.
TENANT IN COMMON.

Ouster of One by Another.-In 1834, orator purchased a lot ?f land
with the joint funds of himself and his two brothers, taking and holding
the title of two undivided thirds thereof in trust for his brothers equally.
In 1842 and 1843, the brothers respectively conveyed one undivided
third of said land to C., by deed of warranty. Upon C.'s death, the
thirds so conveyed to him were set to his daughter P. Afterwards the
guardian of P. conveyed them to J. R.; and finally, through J. R., in
1870, they came to defendant. Held, on a bill for partition and an
accounting, tha orator and defendant were tenants in common of the
whole lot: Chandlerv. Ricker, 49 Verm.
A tenant in Common, to' show an.ouster of his co-tenant, must sho.w
acts of possession inconsistent with, and exclusive of, the rights of such
co-tenant, and such as would amount to an ouster between landlord and

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

tenant, and knowledge on the part of his co-tenant of his claim of exclusive 6wnership. Proof of notice to one who had been the agent of the
co-tenant for watching trespassers and paying taxes, but whose agency
had terminated before the giving of notice, is insufficient proof of the
knowledge required to be shown, both because of the narrowness of the
agency and of its previous termination. Evidence that the land is a
wild, mountain lot, nearly covered with forest, and that the occupation
was under a deed conveying an undivided part thereof, and by an occasional cutting of a few trees for shingles or timber, and by peeling and
carrying away a few loads of bark, at a merely nominal profit, is, in itself,
of little weight as evidence of the acts required to be shown : Id.
TORT.
Efect of a Release under Seal of one of three joint Tort-feasors, as
to the right to recover against the Others.-An action was brought
against three persons as joint tort-feasors. Pending the suit the plaintiffs executed to L., one of the defendants, a release under seal in
which it was declared that it was not to prejudice, or impair the plaintiffs' claim against the other two defendants. The release was executed
in consideration of $500, and in terms released and discharged. L. from
all claims of every description for damages accruing or accrued by reason
of the wrongs complained of; the plaintiffs thereby acknowledging themselves "t6 be fully paid and satisfied for all and singular the trespasses
complained of" by them in the suit then pending against the three defendants jointly. Held: 1. That the release enured to the benefit of all
the defendants, and was a bar to the action. 2. That the proviso in the
release, by which the right to recover for the same injury against the
other defendants was attempted to be reserved to the plaintiffs, was simply void, being repugnant to the legal effect and operation of the release
itself: Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md.
TowN.
Sufficiency of Notice of Injury upon .flighwa&.-The notice of injury
upon a highway was, that plaintiff claimed damage of the town for injuries to himself and his team, on October 18th 1873, 1-at a certain bridge"
on the highway in question, "1located between William Mitchell's and
Hugh Mitchell's!' The houses of the Mitchells were about one hundred
rods apart, and there were two bridges between them, about twenty rods
apart. The bridge on which the injury was received was a log-and-pole
bridge, and the other, and larger, a plank bridge. Plaintiff had been
accustomed to pass over the road frequently-knew it well, and knew
the facts above stated in regard to the two bridges. Held, that the notice
sufficiently designated the place where the injury was received : Ranney
v. Town of Sheffield, 49 Verm.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.

Following Trust Fun.-A trust fund, so long as it can be traced,
may be followed for the purpose of enforcing the trust: Barwick v.
White, 2 Del. Ch.
A promissory note, taken by an administrator for proceeds of laud of
his decedent sold under an order of the Orphans' Court for the payment
of debts; and showing on its faice the purpose for which it was given, is
a trust fund: Id.
Upon the death of th6 administrator, the'assignment of the note by
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his administratrix to pay his debts is a breach of trust and a legal fraud,
for which the administratrix and her assignee are liable in equity: Id.
Laipse of Time.-Lapse of time does nor bar a direct trust as between
the trustee and cestui que trust; otherwise, as to constructive trusts:
Uartmell v. Perkins, 2 Del. Ch.

A legacy charged upon land, and payable by the devisee of the land,
is a trust fhlling within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity,
and as such is not subject to the equitable defence of lapse of time, by
analogy to the Statute of Limitations ; otherwise, of a legacy payable by
the executor or administrator of the personal estate, and which is. recoverable both at law and in equity: Id.
Chancer -Appontment of New Trustees-Interferencewith discretion

in Exercise).fa Power.-Principles upon which a court of equity controls
the exercise of a power to appoint new trustees: Bailey v. Bailey, 2 Del. Oh.
The court will not prevent the exercise of a discretion given for the
appointment of trustees, but will see that it has been duly exercised, so as
to subserve the purposes contemplated in the creation of the power: Id.
The cestui que trust, under a devise of a fund in trust, being authorized;
upon the death or refusal of the trustee to act, to appoint "a suitable
person" to act in his place-Hed,that the son of the cestui que trust-

a young man and without property-was not such "suitable .person,"
nor was he entitled to a decree for the delivery of the trust funds, without security'first given to the satisfaction of the court: Id.
VENDOR AND PUROASER.

$Sale of Land-Relief of Vendee in case of Fraud-:Reicission.-A

purchaser, under a contract for the sale of land, who has accepted a deed
and entered ifito possession, will, nevertheless, be relieved in equity
against a dafect of title 'afterwards discovered by him, if fraud in the
sale was practiseduepon him by the vendor. Otherwise, it seems, if the
deed'were accepted in the-absence offraud: Hfouston v. Burley, 2 Del. Ch.

The right to rescind a contract for fraud must be exercised promptly
after the discovery of it: Id.
A purchaser under a contract for the sale of land accepted a deed and
entered into possession in Jbecember 1854, soon after which he discovered that the land had been sold, before the conveyance to him, for
unpaid taxesi but he continued in possession until 1858, when, without
eviction, he abandoned it. Held, that after so long delay he was not
entitled to wholly rescind the contract; but held also, that a portion of
the purchase-money remaining unpaid, a court of equity will restrain
the collection of it until a good title be made: Id.
WARRANTY.
See Damages.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.

- Negligence- Obstructing a Jill-race-Dutyof Person.Injuredto avoid
consequences'as far as he reasonably can-Damages-LostProfits.-In

an action for obstructing the race leading to the plaiintiff's distillery by
throwing or placing therein, or by cutting and allowing to fall therein,
trees, branches,. logs, stumps, brush, chips, stakes, leaves, &c., whereby
damage accrued to the plaintiff, the question is not whether the defendant has acted with due care, but whether his acts have occasioned the
damage complained of. If the acts complained were done by the defend-
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ant, or by his agents or servants in the course of their employment, they
were unlawful invasions of the plaintiff's rights of property, and it matters
not that they were done without negligence. Negligence is not the

gravamen of the action: Lawson v. Price, 45 Md.
Where wrong is done by the obstruction of a mill-race, it is the duty
of the party injured to avoid the consequences of such wrong, as far as
he reasonably can. If, by labor, or a reasonable outlay of money, he can
stay or avoid the consequences of the wrong, he should do so. All consequences resulting from his own wilful failure or gross neglect to use
timely and reasonable precaution to prevent an extension or increase of
the injury, should fall upon himself: Id.
The placing an obstruction in a mill-race is an infringement of the
owner's absolute right of property, and the continuing such 6bstruction"
is equally an infringement of the right, and this the party placing the
obstruction in the race is bound to know at his peril, and he has no claim to
notice from the owner to remove the obstruction before action brought: .1d.
In an action on the case for obstructing the race leading to the plaintiff's distillery, the declaration averred that by reason of the wrong complained of, the plaintiff had "lost the whole benefit, profit and advantage
of his said distillery, and had been greatly prejudiced and damnified in
his possession thereof, and in his said trade, business and employment ;"
and there was very definite proof before the jury as to the extent of
profit that was lost in consequence of the obstruction of the race. Held,
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for all the consequences legitimately resulting from the wrongful acts of the defendant, including the
loss of profits on the product of the distillery during the time the injury
was suffered: Id.
WAY.
.Private R i7t over Land of Grantor-Erectionof Gate.-Nothing

passes as incident to the grant of a private way over one's land, but that
which is necessary for its reasonable and proper enjoyment: Baker v.
Frick, 45 Md.

What is necessary for such reasonable and proper enjoyment of the
way granted, and the limitations thereby imposed on the use of the land
by the proprietor, depends upon the terms of the grant, the purposes for
which it was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to
the easement, and the manner in which it has been used and occupied: Id.
In an action by the grantee of a private right of way against the
grantor, for the obstruction of the way by the erection of gates, it was
Held, that the questions whether under all the circumstances of the case
as disclosed by the testiipony, the gates were necessary to the defendant
for the useful and beneficial occupation of his land, looking to the situation
of his property; and whether the particular gates complained of were
usual and proper under the circumstances; and the further question
whether their existence upon the road interfered with the reasonable
use of the right qf way by the plaintiff, considering the situation of his
property, and the manner in which it was occupied, and- the intent of
the parties as to the mode in which the right of way was to be used,
were all questions proper to be decided by the jury upon the evidence
in the case: Id.
See Notice.
WRITING.

